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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UNIVERSAL UNDERWRITERS 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE 
COMP ANY, a Corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
11176 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff and appel-
lant, Universal Underwriters Insurance Company, 
against defendant and respondent, Allstate Insur-
ance Company, to recover the amounts of money 
spent by the plaintiff and appellant in settling a 
personal injury action brought against Olsen Chev-
rolet, Inc., which was the insured under a liability 
policy issued by the appellant and a liability policy 
issued by the respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon stipulated facts, both parties moved for 
summary judgments before the Honorable Stewart 
M. Hanson; and Memorandums of Law having been 
submitted and argument made, the court granted 
1 
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the respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and denied the appellant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant requests this Court to reverse the 
trial court's judgment denying the appellant's Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment and granting the re-
spondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
granting a summary judgment in favor of the ap-
pellant. Or in the alternative, vacate the judgment 
of the lower court and return the case for the de-
termination of any controlling issues of fact. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties, by their Complaint and Answer 
filed herein, have agreed essentially to the following 
facts: 
On or about April 3, 1967, Olsen Chevrolet, a 
corporation, was in the business of selling, servic-
ing, and repairing new and used cars, with its prin· 
cipal place of business in Layton, Utah. On or about 
the 3rd day of April, 1967, one Ralph C. Bradbrook 
had made arrangements with Walter T. Smedley, 
an owner and agent of Olsen Chevrolet, to have the 
Bradbrook 1965 Oldsmobile serviced at Olsen Chev· 
rolet's place of business in Layton. It was agreed 
that in order to accommodate Mr. Bradbrook Mr. 
Smedley would leave with Mr. Bradbrook an Olso.n 
Chevrolet demonstrator to be used by him while his 
vehicle was undergoing repairs and servicing. The 
demonstrator was left with Bradbrook, and Smedley 
2 
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took the Bradbrook automobile to Layton to be ser-
viced and repaired. After the servicing and repairs 
had been finished, an employee of Olsen Chevrolet 
was dispatched to deliver the Bradbrook automobile 
to Bradbrook and to return the demonstrator to Ol-
sen Chevrolet. While said Michael Dean Lee was in 
the process of returning the Bradbrook automobile, 
he collided with a minor pedestrian by the name of 
James Eccleston near the intersection of Utah High-
way 232 and 2181 North Hill Field Road in Layton, 
Utah. As a result of the collision, said minor, 
through his father William J. Eccleston, made a 
claim against Olsen Chevrolet and Michael Dean 
Lee for personal injuries. 
At the time of the said accident, Olsen Chev-
rolet, Inc., was the named insured under a liability 
policy issued by the appellant, and the Bradbrook 
Oldsmobile was the described vehicle under a liabil-
ity policy issued by the respondent to Bradbrook. 
The policy of insurance issued by the appellant to 
Olsen Chevrolet limited its liability to that of secon-
dary responsibility in situations where its agents 
and employees were operating a non-owned vehicle: 
"USE OF OTHER AUTOMOBILES -
BROAD FORM ENDORSEMENT 
3. OTHER INSURANCE. This insuran~e 
shall be excess insurance over any other valid 
and collectible insurance for bodily injury 
liability, or property damage liability and for 
automobile medical payments." 
The policy of insurance issued by the respondent to 
3 
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the said Ralph C. Bradbrook provided primary cov. 
er~ge for liability arising from the use of the des. 
cribed automobile subject, however, to several ex-
clusions, the only pertinent one being the automobile 
business exclusion, which provided: 
"EXCLUSIONS - WHAT THIS PART OF 
THE POLICY DOES NOT COVER 
THIS PART ONE DOES NOT APPLY TO: 
... (2) An owned automobile while used in 
an automobile business ... " 
And said automobile business was defined in the 
said policy as follows: 
" 'Automobile Business' means the business 
of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or 
parking of automobiles." 
Responsibility for the Eccleston claim was ten· 
dered to the respondent by the appellant; however, 
the respondent refused to defend the claim, and the 
appellant under a reservation of rights agreement 
with Olsen Chevrolet proceeded to settle the claim 
for $300 and in doing so incurred adjustment and 
settlement expenses of $261.89. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING EF-
FECT TO THE AUTOMOBILE BUSINESS EX-
CLUSION CONTAINED IN THE RESPON-
DENT'S INSURANCE POLICY INASMUCH 
AS THE USE OF THE AUTOMOBILE AT THE 
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT DOES NOT COME 
WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE RESPON-
4 
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DENT'S NARROWLY DEFINED AUTOMO~ 
BILE BUSINESS EXCLUSION. 
Although the respondent's pleadings do not 
specifically admit that the respondent's policy was 
primary if the automobile business exclusion were 
not to be considered, it nevertheless has been agreed 
between the parties that for the purpose of this ac-
tion, it is to be assumed that the respondent would 
be primary if the automobile business exclusion did 
not apply. Therefore, the only issue to be decided on 
this appeal is whether or not under the facts stated 
the respondent's automobile business exclusion al-
lows the respondent to escape liability on the Eccle-
ston claim. 
It is the contention of the appellant that the 
automobile business exclusion contained in the re-
spondent's policy does not apply to the particular 
use of the automobile at the time of the accident, 
and secondly that under the circumstances the 
policy is also ambiguous and therefore should be 
construed against the respondent. 
It is obvious that under the policy of insurance 
issued to Bradbrook by the respondent that the cov-
erage was extended to a permissive user of the nam-
ed automobile and that coverage could only be avoid-
ed by a specific exclusion of the particular use of 
the vehicle at the time of the accident. Such exclu-
sions are to be construed narrowly, Cherot vs. Unit-
ed States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 264 F. 2nd 
767 ( 1959), and any doubts therein resolved against 
5 
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the insurance company issuing said policy. Stout vs. 
Washington Fire & Marine Insurance Company, 14 
Utah 2nd 414, 385 Pac. 2nd 608 ( 1963). 
The particular automobile business exclusion 
used jn the Allstate policy is ambiguous on its face 
and becomes even more ambiguous when applied to 
the facts in the present case. The Allstate automo-
bile business exclusion has on numerous occasions 
come before the courts for a determination of its 
meaning, and the courts have found the policy to be 
ambiguous and have held that the exclusion did not 
apply. The case of Goforth vs. Allstate Insurance 
Company, 220 F. Supp. 616, (DC North Carolina, 
1964) , is on all fours with the present action. There 
the owner of the private automobile had requested 
the garage service station operator to repair his 
automobile; and as an accommodation to his cus-
tomer, the service station owner was driving the 
vehicle from the owner's place of business to the 
garage to affect the repairs during which time an 
accident occurred. Allstate Insurance Company had 
issued an automobile liability policy to the automo-
bile owner, and subsequently denied coverage for the 
accident on the basis that it was being used in the 
automobile business within the confines of its ex-
clusion. The district court held that the automobile 
was not being used in the automobile business as 
defined in the Allstate policy. On apoeal to the cir-
cuit court, the decision was affirmed by a per cur· 
ium decision in 327 F. 2nd 637 (CA 4, 1964). The 
6 
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district court said as follows in holding that the use 
of the vehicle at the time of the accident did not 
come within the Allstate exclusion: 
"Herein is the heart o fthe controversy. Coun-
sel for defendant Allstate contends with some 
ingenuity that plaintiff must choose between 
the horns of a dilemma: that if the automo-
bi!e ~as 'used' within the meaning of the per-
m1ss1 ve user clause of the policy it must have 
been used 'in the automobile business' which 
excludes coverage. This is an oversimplifica-
tion and ignores the definition contained in 
the policy of 'automobile business.' That bus-
iness could, of course, include the transporta-
tion of motor vehicles to and from a garage 
for the purpose of repairing. No such mean-
ing (i.e. transporting) is found within the 
definition, and it would have been easy to 
supply. The policy was written by Allstate and 
not by the additional insured Melton (service 
station operator). Wherever ambiguous, it 
should be read against the scrivener. Pepsi 
Cola Bottling Company of Charleston and 
Travelers Insurance Company vs. Indemnity 
Insurance Company of North America, 318 
F. 2nd 714 (CA 4, 1963). This rudimentary 
rule of construction applies not only in favor 
of the policyholder but also in ~av.or of ~he 
additional insured, ibid. The on11ss1on to m-
clude transporting of automobiles along with 
selling repairing, servicing, storing or park-
ing th~m is significant, and implies an intent 
not to enlarge the exclusion." Supra, page 618 
The court also held that Melton was entitled to the 
expenses he incurred in defending the action. 
The reasoning followed by the court in the Go-
7 
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forth decision appears to be irresistible to the pre. 
sent f~cts. Not only are the facts identical, but the 
same msurance company and the same provision are 
also at issue. Other states presented with the same 
problem as Goforth also denied effect to the Allstate 
exclusion. Some of those cases are: 
Capece vs. Allstate Insurance Company, 207 A 
2nd 207, New Jersey (1965). In this case the own. 
er had left her automobile with the service station 
to be serviced. As her car was being driven into th1 
service station, the plaintiff was injured. Allstatt 
provided insurance for the driver of the vehicle a: 
the time of the accident. As one of its grounds for 
refusing to defend the case, Allstate set forth th~ 
automobile business exclusion. In holding that thi 
exclusion did not apply, the court said: 
". . A customer's automobile which is left 
in the custody of the proprietor of a ser~ct 
station for servicing or repairs is not berni 
used in the automobile business within thi 
meaning of an exclusion such as the one hen 
involved ... " Supra, page 214 
Wilks vs. Allstate Insurance Company, 11i 
South 2nd 790, Louisiana ( 1965). The owner oi 
the vehicle, Calhoun, had driven to a service stati~r 
and told the owner Jacobs to wash the car and fil 
it with gas.Jacobs sent his employee Dronet to dri\'i 
Calhoun to his place of business and then return tn, 
car back to the service station so the repairs coulr 
be accomplished. ·while Dronet was driving the ca' 
8 
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from Calhoun's place of business back to the ser-
vice station, he was involved in a collision with 
"Wilks. Allstate provided coverage for the described 
automobile. The trial court granted Allstate's Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment based upon the auto-
mobile business exclusion. On appeal the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana reversed, holding that the auto-
mobile business exclusion in the Allstate policy did 
not apply under the facts. In so holding the court 
said: 
"We think it is obvious from the above-dis-
cussed jurisprudence that the exclusionary 
clause in the present case is at least ambigu-
ous. The clause, 'used in the automobile bus-
iness,' is certainly susceptible of at least two 
meanings. It could mean ( 1) that the auto-
mobile is excluded if it is simply in the pos-
session of the automobile business, or it could 
mean (2) that the automobile is excluded 
only if being driven in furtherance of the bus-
iness or as a means of furnishing services to 
customers, as for instance a delivery truck, 
tow car, etc. It is too well settled in our juris-
prudence to require citation of authority that 
if an insurance policy is ambiguous, it must 
be construed against the insurer." Supra, 
page 794 
And in the case of Allstate Insurance Company 
vs. Skowinski, 189 N.E. 2nd 365, Illinois (1963), 
the court held that the Allstate automobile exclusion 
did not apply where an accident occurred as the car 
was being driven into the service station. 
It is clear from the above-cited cases that the 
9 
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Allstate policy is at the very least ambiguous where 
an attempt is being made to apply it under circum. 
stances where the accident occurs while the auto. 
mobile is being delivered either to or from the place 
of service. And equally obvious is the fact that the 
Allstate policy is limited to the definition which it 
contains and that following the rule of strict con· 
struction where coverage is being excluded, the use 
of the automobile as in the present situation is out· 
side the scope of the exclusion. Had the Allstate 
policy contained a definition of the automobile bus· 
iness which included words describing the activity 
of delivering cars to and from the place of service, 
then, of course, a much different situation woulU 
be presented; however, such is not the case here. 
Other cases involving similar fact situations 
and automobile business exclusions identical with 
the Allstate exclusion have also come to the samt 
result. In the case of DU?nas vs. Hartford Accidenl 
& Indemnity Company, 181 South 2nd 841, Louisi· 
ana ( 1965), the owner of a service station had com· 
pleted the servicing of the automobile and as an ac· 
commodation to the owner was driving the vehicle 
back to the owner's residence when he was involveo 
in a collision. The insurer of the automobile, Hart· 
ford, denied coverage for the reason that the car 
was being used in the automobile business. The court 
held that the accident occurred after completion ol 
the servicing, and not while the business of servic· 
ing the automobile was being performed, and that 
10 
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therefore the Hartford exclusion would not apply. 
Lefelt vs. Nasarow, 177 A. 2nd 315, New Jer-
sey ( 1962). There the customer's automobile was 
being test driving after the repairs has been com-
pleted. The court held that it was not being used 
within the meaning of the automobile business ex-
clusion clause, which was identical with the Allstate 
exclusion here. 
Trolio vs. McClendon, 224 N.E. 2nd 117, Ohio 
( 1967) . There the repairman had finished the re-
pairs on the automobile and was test driving it 
when the accident occurred. The automobile busi-
ness exclusion contained in the automobile insured's 
policy was identical to that of Allstate's policy here. 
The court held that testing repairs after they had 
been completed was not within the meaning of the 
exclusion contained in that policy. 
Western Alliance Insurance Company vs. Cox, 
394 S.W. 2nd 238, Texas (1965), where it was held 
that the automobile was not being used in the auto-
mobile business as defined in the policy, which was 
identical with that of the Allstate policy where it 
appeared that the owner had driven his car to a 
service station for servicing and was then driven 
back to his place of business, the accident occurring 
when the service station operator's agent was driv-
ing the car from the owner's place of business back 
to the service station to accomplish the repairs. 
In the case of Northwestern Mutual Insurance 
11 
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Company vs. Great Anierican Insurance Company 
404 Pac. 2nd 995, Washington ( 1966), the operato;. 
of a service station had picked up the insured's auto-
mobile at his home, drove it to his service station 
where he serviced it, and then while he was return-
ing the car to the owner he was involved in a colli. 
sion. The court held that the automobile was not 
being used in the automobile business as defined in 
the automobile business exclusion of the owner's in-
surance policy. 
The above cases are a sampling of cases con-
tained in 71 ALR 2nd 959 and its supplements, 
which are directly in point with the present case 
and have held against applying the automobile bus-
iness exclusion under similar facts. 
The respondent in its Memorandum of Law 
filed in support of its Motion for Summary Judg· 
ment relies upon the case of National Farmers Un· 
ion vs. Farmers Insurance Group, 14 Utah 2nd 89, 
377 Pac. 2nd 796 ( 1963), which case was reliea 
upon by the lower court in granting the respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellant respect· 
fully submits that that case does not concern itseli 
with the point here at issue. It merely held that a 
customer using a salesman's car was not involved in 
the automobile business. If anything relative to the 
present situation could be gleaned from that case, it 
is the statement of the court that an essential factor 
in determining whether the exclusion applied wouJO 
be whether or not the car was being used for a bus1· 
12 
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ness purpose as defined by the policy. The respon-
dent obviously would argue that that case stands for 
the proposition that if the use of the car was for a 
business purpose connected with the repair and ser-
vicing of the automobile, it came within the exclu-
sion. However, the Utah court limited business pur-
pose by conditioning it upon 'he definition in the 
policy of the automobile business. Thus we get back 
to the original proposition that the liability of All-
state falls upon the application of its particular de-
finition of automobile business to the present facts. 
Obviously in the present case the use of the vehicle 
was not for a business purpose inasmuch as it was 
merely an accommodation to the owner. However, 
even if it were said to be a business purpose to de-
liver the car to the owner, such facet of the automo-
bile business was not provided for in the Allstate 
definition of automobile business, and therefore said 
use is outside the sphere of the exclusion. 
In regards to the Universal Underwriters vs. 
Strohkorb case cited by the respondent in its Mem-
orandum of Law, that case could be readily distin-
guished on the basis that the vehicle was being used 
to affect the repairs on it; that is, driving the car 
from one location of the garage business to another 
location of that business to complete the repairs. In 
this regard appellant acknowledges that there have 
been cases which have upheld the automobile busi-
ness exclusion; however, an examination of those 
cases will reveal that the facts differ from those in 
13 
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the present case in that the accident occurred while 
the vehicle was being used directly within the defin. 
ition contained in the particular policy, with some 
policies being more broad than the Allstate policy, 
thus providing a greater range of activities falling 
within the exclusion. Appellant contends, however, 
that the present cas~ is no different than the other 
above-cited Allstate cases, especially the Gofort/1 
case, and that the Allstate policy is ambiguous as 
stated in the above-cited Wilks case, and that All· 
state has restricted itself to a definition of activities 
within which the delivery of an automobile after 
the repairs had been completed fails to fall. It there· 
fore being obvious as a matter of law that the All· 
state exclusion does not apply to the use in question, 
and the primary responsibility of Allstate therefore 
attaches for the expenses incurred by the appellant 
in settling the Eccelston claim. 
Appellant therefore respectfully requests the 
Court to reverse the lower court, and grant the ap· 
pellant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Respectfully submited, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
W. BRENT WILCOX, Esq. 
520 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
By W. Brent Wilcox 
14 
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